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VALUE AND RICHES by FERDINANDO MEACCI Università di Padova
The distinction between 'value' and 'riches' was first highlighted by Ricardo (1821) in Chapter XX, 'Value and Riches, their distinctive Properties', of his
Principles. Ricardo's aim was to clear up Smith's famous statement that "every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life" (1776, Bk.I, Ch.V; italics added).
Indeed, Smith's statement was ambiguously worded in at least three different senses. First, because it is unclear whether the 'necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life' are all those which constitute 'wealth in itself' according to Cantillon's canonical definition or only those which are the result of 'human exertion'.
Secondly, because the expression 'can afford to enjoy' is not as precise as the expression (which it seems to replace) 'can afford to purchase in order to enjoy'.
Thirdly, because, in so far as it comes to 'human exertion' and this takes place in the context of the division of labour, what every man is 'to enjoy' are not, strictly speaking, his necessaries etc., but rather (and particularly so if one thinks of the verb 'to purchase' before the verb 'to enjoy') a share of the necessaries etc. available in the economy in a period of time (namely a share of the 'wealth or revenue' -to use Smith's repeated expression-of the whole society). In this sense the eventual impact of Smith's statement was to obscure, rather than to clarify, what Smith himself brings to light in other parts of his work, namely the distinction between the wealth of an individual and the wealth of the whole society: whilst the former consists of exchange values (the typical object of purchase and sale) the latter consists of use values (the typical object of production and consumption).
The scope of this distinction, on which Malthus was to cast his own ray of light when he pointed out that value "is not only the great stimulus to the production of all kinds of wealth, but the great regulator of the forms and relative quantities in which it shall exist" (Malthus, 1836, Ch.VI) , is blurred by Smith one page later when he writes that "wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power". For, granted that Smith qualifies this statement by pointing out the obvious, namely that the power conveyed by wealth is not a political but just a market power, he fails to qualify it to the extent of making it clear that the power conferred by wealth in this sense is -to be as precise as Smith himself is with regard to the distinction between a political and a market power-the power of purchasing rather than the power of enjoying goods.
The relationship between wealth in the sense of purchasing and wealth in the sense of enjoying, and therefore between wealth in the sense of exchange values and wealth in the sense of use values, was highlighted by De Quincey (1844, Ch.I).
After arguing that value in use, 'the original element', may be viewed in two states,
i.e. either totally disengaged from 'the secondary element', value in exchange, or as not disengaged from this element; this author proceeds to ask: "What name does it take in the first state, where it is wholly disengaged from the power of purchasing? It should be added, however, that Smith's obscurities may lie less in his text than in the minds of his followers and critics. Consider, for instance, Ricardo himself. In his attempt to clear up this issue Ricardo rightly argues that "the man in possession of a scarce commodity is richer, if by means of it he can command more of the necessaries and enjoyments of human life" and that "as the general stock out of which each man's riches are drawn is diminished in quantity, by all that any individual takes from it, other men's shares must necessarily be reduced" (which implies that changes in exchange values alter the distribution of national wealth amongst individuals). But he continues by stating that "riches do not depend on value", and by rewording Smith's statement in the different sense that "a man is rich or poor according to the abundance of necessaries and luxuries which he can command; and whether the exchangeable value of these for money, for corn, or for labour, be high or low, they will equally contribute to the enjoyment of their possessor" (italics added). Now it cannot be denied that wealth as power of enjoying does not change when the exchange values of its elements do. But, if this were the case, Ricardo's very sentence should in turn be reworded in the different sense that "a man is rich or poor according to the abundance of necessaries and luxuries which he can enjoy".
For it is true that, once the amount of these necessaries etc. is given, the enjoyment Ricardo's discussion of the distinction between value and riches attains a maximum of consistency when he turns against Say's 'unfortunate' discussion of this very distinction (Say, 1814 secondly, to the contradictions resulting from Say's notion that "the riches of a society" are composed of "the sum total of the values which it possesses", a notion which incorporates all the ambiguities discussed above and particularly the confusion between value in use and value in exchange (Ricardo, 1821, 287-8, n.1).
